Mesa County's Rampant Social Security Fraud and Judicial Corruption – Isn't It Time To Recall the Commissioners En Masse?
Written By John Wilkenson and has granted VetTheGov permission to post
This exposé/essay is in part a citizen's indictment of corrupt government, and, in part, an experiment to see if internet/computer technology and citizen journalism -- (BE THE MEDIA!) -- can win a political contest against the VDM (vestigial dinosaur media, aka "MSM") and the duopoly (GOP/DEM) establishment corruptocrats who have a political stranglehold on Mesa County. It is an exercise in 1st-Amendment-protected political/opinion speech. For all those individuals who like to incessantly whine to their friends about Mesa County's corrupt "Good Old Boy" (GOB) gang while doing nothing of real effect/impact to correct the situation, I (your humble author/editor) very much need your help in getting the truth out about the systemic "circling of the wagons" to cover up local judicial felonies1. You can help by sharing this exposé/essay with every Mesa County resident/voter you know. Please feel free to copy and disseminate all or any part of it.
There will, of course, be a tendency for Mesa County's 75% duopoly lemmings/sheeple to want to shoot the messenger/herald/bearer of this bad news because it illuminates the actual mechanics of how what many locals call the “Good Old Boy” gang – (it is simultaneously bipartisan and non-partisan) – controls the local politics of Mesa County and prevents the election of openly pro-US-Constitution candidates. Unfortunately there isn't much I can do about that other than tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God, and let the chips fall where they may.
THE COVER-UP OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY MESA COUNTY'S "GOOD OLD BOY" (GOB) CORRUPTOCRACY:
The local GOB establishment corruptocrats, ostensibly led by various unknown and unnamed powers that be at the Daily Sentinel -- (reporter Gary Harmon, with whom your humble author is acquainted and considers to be a genuinely nice guy, has been in possession of most of the facts of this case for many years) -- have doubled down on their efforts to cover up crimes1, including felonies, perpetrated by various local judicial officers against litigants who appear before them in family court. Question is: how do you uncover and effectively fight such a massive, pervasive and powerful cover-up? Answer: citizen journalism via the power of internet/computer technology.
Of course, fairness and accountability demand acknowledgement that the current publisher (aka "power that is") of the Sentinel is Jay Seaton. It remains to be seen whether he is going to continue in the Sentinel's tradition of GOB cover-ups, or whether he is going to introduce a new era of serious and meaningful transparency. Oopsie! Here's a story Jay missed: "Mesa County DHS Executive Director Drains Budget with Raises & Bonuses". But then here's one he didn't miss: "Former Junction mayor accused of shoplifting maps, candy at Cabela’s". I guess nobody's clean, Democrats or Republicans, eh, Reford? Unfortunately, it doesn't appear that you would learn that from the Sentinel, though. I guess Republicans' sins are more interesting than judicial felonies.
Fairness and accountability also demand recognition of the fact that nearly every person in Mesa County knows about such GOB corruptocrat scandals as the airport scandal, the building of the new police station (despite the project twice being turned down by the voters), the BLM road closures, the de facto appointment of the Mesa County Sheriff by the "powers that be" (or "powers that were" at the time) in the Mesa County Republican party apparatus, and a candidate for the school board living outside the district he was trying to represent, ad infinitum. Hundreds, if not thousands, of people have similar horror stories. The list of GOB abuses of power in Mesa County is literally endless.
MESA COUNTY'S "THERAPY CULTURE/INDUSTRY" OF DEPENDENCY AND VICTIMHOOD:
Most people are unaware that, depending on whose estimate you go by, some 35,000+ to 45,000 people in Mesa County are receiving some sort of financial assistance through Mesa County's Department of Human Services (MCDHS) which, in turn, gets tens of millions of dollars in matching funds from Social Security. Much of that money comes in the form of funds matching whatever moneys can be unconstitutionally extracted from men by the misandristic so-called "deadbeat dad" industry. The misnamed "Family Support Act of 1988" -- actually a family destruction act -- was a very cunning recipe for the funding of local GOB corruption, because local GOB corruptocrats will go to virtually any criminal lengths to keep that outside federal money flowing into their counties.
There was no public policy discussion about this self-evidently UNSUSTAINABLE paradigm/model. Mesa County's electorate didn't get to vote on it. It simply happened as a result of the unfortunate "perfect-storm"-type combination of elitist corruptocrats' greed/manipulation and militant misandristic gender-feminist (aka "feminazi") agenda pandemic at MCDHS fraudulently masquerading as "Because Kids Matter Most".
So terrible is the "victim-therapy" culture/industry of dependence in Mesa County that Taker "government" actually advertises it's so-called "services" on billboards and in media in much the same manner as Maker business enterprises advertise the goods and services they have for sale. It's enough to make a billy goat -- (and any pro-self-ownership, pro-individual-rights, pro-US-Constitution, pro-Rule-of-Law individual/s) -- puke.
For the information/edification of all the "for the children" scammers out there, children are NOT the first and most important thing/consideration in a free and open society, because it's self-evidently NOT in the best interest of children (or the American culture) to be brought up in foster homes in an anti-God, anti-morality, anti-US-Constitution, anti-Rule-of-Law atmosphere and culture of lies, misandry, irresponsibility, unaccountability and manipulation.
I hate to be the bearer of bad news to the "politically correct" crowd, but without traditional family values, Golden-Rule morality, U.S.-Constitution-and-Bill-of-Rights-based Rule of Law, children and adults alike are doomed to serfdom, strife and despair. It is self-evidently stupid to politicize and manipulate the status of childhood for personal gain. So, no, "kids don't matter most", Liberty and Justice for all, and, dare I use the term, Golden-Rule Righteousness, matter more.
THE ECONOMICS OF MESA COUNTY'S "GOOD OLD BOY" (GOB) CORRUPTOCRACY:
Here's a brief word about GOB systemic corruption by world-class banking insider and whistleblower, Catherine Austin Fitts:
"In 1998 I left Washington [DC] and really tried to engage and engage with different people and communities on how we could turn it around. And one of the reasons you can't turn it around, or we haven't to date, is the corruption at the local level is as serious as it is in the Washington and Wall Street level. You know, the corruption is all the way from the bottom to the top and back down again. And the reality is at the local level this is all being engineered and enforced by people who are willing to do it for a very small amount of money and very minor prestige and position.” “We've created a machinery where the big banks could make more money from people's failure than they could from their success. And so when a lender can print money out of thin air and make money from your defaulting, you know, it's a big problem.” ~ Catherine Austin Fitts, founder of The Solari Report, a website designed "help you build wealth in ways that build real wealth in the wider economy."
There are only two economic paradigms/models which are relevant to Mesa County politics. One -- (the one I prefer) -- is a SUSTAINABLE "bottom-up" Austrian-Economics-and-self-ownership-based decentralized agrarian "Maker" REAL economy which uses constitutionally valid commodity-based money, and where REAL wealth is created and money brought into the county by people making things and exporting them to willing buyers in a coercion-free marketplace. In this model, the people/peasantry/proletariat/hoi polloi are in control of the "government".
The second paradigm/model -- (the one I despise for it's abject dishonesty, manipulation, immorality and destructiveness) -- is an UNSUSTAINABLE "top-down" Keynesian-Economics-and-slavery-based centralized collectivist "Taker" delusional economy which uses blatantly UNconstitutional debt-as-legal-tender-based musical-chairs monetary numbers created at will out of thin air by the anonymous unaccountable, unelected debt-as-legal-tender oligarchs, and where wealth is created and money brought into the county by corruptocrats and other government manipulators controlling politics, government grants and such, and bringing outside (mostly) federal and state government "money" into the county. In this model, the people/peasantry/proletariat/hoi polloi are taxpayer/slaves to the "government" criminal GOB cabal.
THE MECHANICS OF MESA COUNTY'S "GOOD OLD BOY" (GOB) CORRUPTOCRACY:
If you want to control the politics of a county in order to make money for yourself and your cronies, friends, relatives and followers, it's a good idea to have several key "government" players in your back pocket. For a clever GOB cabal, such players might include the local so-called "journal of record", the local television station with the greatest viewership, a majority of county commissioners, a majority of a city council, a chief judge, a district attorney, a sheriff and a chief of police. That's how it's always been done in big-time places like New York and Chicago. That way the corruptocrats and bureaurats can use the local so-called "justice" system to strategically reward their friends and punish their enemies whenever controversies and disagreements devolve into litigation.
Per Voltaire's famous admonition, “If you wish to converse with me define your terms", by "corruptocrat" I mean assorted wealthy and influential people such as bankers, politicians, important law firms and big businessmen -- in other words, politically well-connected individuals who control and wield power and money. By "bureaurat" I mean pretty much anybody who works in and/or for the government. Most bureaurats are not as wealthy as most corruptocrats, but many aspire to become wealthy and powerful corruptocrats. In fairness, these definitions specifically exclude any and all of the honest government employees who might be glad that I wrote this exposé. (One local law enforcement officer, who believes in Rule of Law, and who shall remain anonymous to prevent retaliation told David, "You have to get this stuff out to the people." Obviously, that type of person is not a "bureaurat".)
Unbeknownst to the 75% duopoly lemmings/sheeple, political parties mean absolutely nothing. (Frequently elections for important offices such and sheriff and DA are unopposed.) Ideology also means nothing. When you see a "liberal" newspaper such as the Sentinel go after a "conservative" politician such as Rose Pugliese for something like violating C.R.S. §24-18-109(3)(a) as it did HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE, do not be deceived. It's not remotely about ideology or transparency or "the people's right to know". If that were the case, "the people" have a "right to know" when their judicial officers commit crimes against litigants who appear before them in court. It is FAR more likely that some influential person or group somewhere in the corruptocracy decided that Pugliese is not enough of a "team player" to suit the GOB corruptocracy. It's ALL about making money for the corruptocrats and giving bureaurats unsustainably good "government" jobs so they don't have to work as box store greeters or burger flippers.
THE ORIGINAL JUDICIAL CRIMES:
Illegally/jurisdictionlessly acting as his own "referral source", now-retired Mesa County District Court (MCDC) Judge Nicholas A. Massaro deliberately strategically lied about my brother David, claiming Dave had a "history of domestic" violence when, to this day, Dave has never committed even one violent act in his life. Massaro ostensibly lied about David so he could illegally/jurisdictionlessly -- in direct violation of the legislative prohibition of jurisdiction contained in C.R.S. 19-1-104(6), Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953), and Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (Colo. en Banc 1951) -- initiate the Title 19 juvenile dependency-and-neglect case No. 96-JV-180 (filed on 4/29/96) when there was already the prior pending Title 14 Case No. 96-DR-372 (filed on 4/19/96) in existence at the time.
MCDC Judge Nicholas Massaro criminally defamed my brother, David Wilkenson, by saying David "has a history of domestic violence", when the truth is a well known local defense attorney -- (who shall remain unnamed to prevent retaliation against him) -- checked into this, and verified that there is absolutely no record of Dave having EVER perpetrating violence of any kind. Additionally, as David's older brother -- nobody knows him better -- I can state to a moral certainty that David is a nonviolent good and decent man who did not deserve to be criminally defamed in such an evil manner that the lie directly determined the illegal outcome of a child custody case. See C.R.S. 18-13-105 Criminal defamation and C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy. C.R.S. 18-13-105 was repealed in 2012, ostensibly to make false reporting to social services by gender feminists less accountable/actionable, at least that's a direct affect. Prior to 2012, criminal libel was a class 6 felony.
Magistrate Jane Westbrook criminally falsely imprisoned Dave for fraudulently alleged "contempt" of court for 18 days. That is a criminal violation of C.R.S. 18-3-303 False imprisonment and C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy. Detaining another "without the other's consent and without proper legal authority" for twelve hours or longer is a class 5 felony. The statutory term "proper legal authority" does NOT mean "just because you are a judge", it means "in obedience/harmony to constitutionally valid law". David had NOT failed to appear. He had appeared via four written verified motions which the court manipulatively refused to rule on. You see, the judicial criminals were doing their very best to screw Dave over in wannabe-clever ways that are all but impossible to appeal.
The entire case was destroyed by unknown/unnamed person/s in prima facie violation of C.R.S. 18-8-610 (Tampering with physical evidence - a Class 6 felony), C.R.S. 18-8-114. Abuse of public records and C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy. Obviously, this was also seriously criminal obstruction of justice.
Interested persons can read the stunning facts surrounding Massaro's arrogant crimes HERE.
Interested persons can read a more detailed timeline of events HERE.
Interested persons can read more about David's ex-wife's disordered and drunken child-endangering behavior HERE.
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS GOVERNMENT CRIMINALS ARE DEPRIVING DAVID WILKENSON OF:
The 1st and 14th Amendment fundamental right of parenting. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
The 5th and 14th Amendment fundamental due process right of insisting that government employees, particularly judges, obey the law instead of deliberatly violating it.
The 4th and 14th Amendment fundamental due process right to a determining of probable cause by a neutral magistrate before driver's license and passport can be seized.
The 4th and 14th Amendment fundamental due process right to a determining of probable cause as to whether or not failure to pay fraudulently alleged arrearages on a prima facie illegal, jurisdictionless and void child support order can serve as constitutionally valid probable cause in a public-safety-related driving charge.
The analogous provisions of the Colorado Constitution which are simultaneously being violated by the government criminals are Article 2 Section 3 Inalienable Rights, Article 2 Section 25 Due Process of Law, Article 2 Section 7 Security of Person and Property Searches Seizures Warrants, Article 2 Section 12 No Imprisonment for Debt, Article 2 Section 16 Criminal Prosecutions Rights of Defendant.
The government criminals, especially the relevant judges, are collectively violating David's fundamental rights by pretending that a prima facie illegal, jurisdictionless and void child support order is valid, and then pretending that that legal nullity (legally nonexistent) order can somehow magically serve as probable cause for the public-safety-related driving crime of driving with a suspended license even though the license was fraudulently suspended.
When I use the word "pretending", that requires clarification. The cutesy government criminals named in the list below aren't pretending by actually stating that the illegal order is valid. They are "pretending" by omission, they are "pretending" by refusing to address the issue. They are "pretending" that they don't have jurisdiction to look into, and/or take judicial notice of, the prima facie illegality of the illegal order. Under the circumstances of this case, their silence is a pretense that they are not acting as accessories to crime. Their silence -- the maxim is "qui tacet consentire videtur" -- is enabling crime. Under the circumstances of this case, their silence, in and of itself, IS a crime for the purposes of C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact) 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights), 18 U.S. Code § 4 - Misprision of felony, and C.R.S. § 18-8-115. Duty to report a crime.
REGARDING THE WANNABE-CLEVER UNSPOKEN SYTEMIC CONSPIRACY:
United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1985):
"A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The evidence must show circumstances to warrant a jury finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810,66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946); United States v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1984). In a conspiracy prosecution, the critical inquiry is whether the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties are of such a character that the minds of reasonable men may conclude therefrom that an unlawful agreement exists. United States v. Butler, 446 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1971); Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1047 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848, 91 S.Ct. 47, 27 L.Ed.2d 85 (1970); Jones v. United States, 251 F.2d 288, 290 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919,78 S.Ct. 703, 2 L.Ed.2d 715 (1958). The conspiracy is complete "when one or more of the conspirators knowingly commit an act in furtherance of the object of the agreement." United States v. Thomas, 468 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 935, 93 S.Ct. 1389, 35 L.Ed.2d 599 (1973). The agreement need not be shown to have been explicit. It may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289 n. 10 (1975); United States v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d at 451; United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84, 86 (10th Cir. 1982).
Two of the 14 points in the holding in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810,66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946) were: "5. It is not important whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful. P. 328 U. S. 809.
6. No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. P. 328 U. S. 809."
THE ONGOING ACCESSORIZED-AFTER-THE-FACT SYSTEMIC CRIMES:
Although over the years Dave has paid some $100,000 in child support -- (some $10,000 more than the law would have required had it been being followed, if judicial crimes had not been committed, and if Dave's violent scofflaw chronically-drunk-driving British-citizen ex-wife had not been dangerously mentally ill) -- the MCDHS, its Child Support Enforcement Unit and the Family Support Registry fraudulently claim arrearages of $63,658.20 are owed. So they retain their illegal deprivation of Dave's driver's license and passport in a criminal effort to deprive David of his most fundamental state and federal constitutional rights to make his life as difficult as humanly possible in a criminal effort to coerce him into waving his legal rights. In my opinion these ongoing systemic crimes constitute de facto obstruction of justice as well as prima facie violations of C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact) 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Just for the sake of example, in a minute I will list a few specific names of local “big shots” (for lack of a better word) who I believe should do some time in prison for the crimes they have committed against my brother, David. The problem is that all of the named people appear on the surface to be basically decent, well-intended people who present themselves well publicly. They all have enough family members, friends and associates who think they are wonderful and vote for them at election time to succeed in putting them into public office. That means they are more “popular” (or more skillful and charismatic liars/manipulators) than the individuals and groups who oppose them at election time.
Some of the people on the list, namely Nicholas Massaro, Jane Westbrook and Cynthia Cyphers, committed crimes1 (both felonies and misdemeanors) against my brother David in family court cases 96-DR-372 and 96-JV-180. Those are the names whose crimes are relative easy to understand and articulate.
The far more subtle and difficult-to-articulate-and-expose crime is comprised of virtually all of the GOB “higher ups” in the “system” acting as de facto accessory after the fact to the original judicial crimes and aiding and abetting in the cover up of those original judicial crimes. See C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), C.R.S. 18-3-303 (False imprisonment), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact). Taken all together in accurate context, what you have is a very deliberate, subtle and unspoken criminal conspiracy to deprive David of his most fundamental constitutional rights. See 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
You see, the biggest problem that the corrupt “system” has is that, according to both the supreme courts of the United States and Colorado, a citizen is under no obligation to obey a jurisdictionless illegal (aka “legal nullity”) order, so long as his or her disobedience is courteous – (David's disobedience has never been anything but courteous) -- See Ex Parte Fisk, 113 US 713 (1885) and Thrap v People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P2d 576 (Colo, January 10, 1977). The order in question was obviously illegal because it occurred in the Title 19 juvenile case 96-JV-180 when there was already in existence a prior pending Title 14 dissolution of marriage and child custody case concerning the same children. 96-DR-372 (filed on 4/19/96) predated 96-JV-180 (filed on 4/29/96) by ten days, so jurisdiction for 96-JV-180 was expressly forbidden by C.R.S. 19-1-104(6), Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953), and Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (Colo. en Banc 1951. (Please notice specifically the words, "and no child custody action or action for the allocation of parental responsibilities concerning the same child is pending in a district court in this state" (emphasis added) in C.R.S. 19-1-104(6). Obviously, case No. 96-JV-180 and all orders in it were illegal/jurisdictionless “ab initio” (from the beginning).
As an aside, what particularly offends me most is that Nicholas Massaro, unethically acting as his own “referral” source in his illegal/jurisdictionless creation of 96-JV-180, deliberately concocted the strategically useful lie that David “has a history of domestic violence” when David has never perpetrated a violent act in his life. (I should know, as the oldest sibling in our family, I was 8 years old when David was born.)
I believe it is impossible for any rational mind to read the 180-page deposition of Paul Sowerby, juxtapose that information next to the fact that Massaro illegally allowed Dave's dangerously disordered alcoholic ex-wife to relocate Ben and Toby Wilkenson to England against Colorado law, against Colorado public policy, and outside the enforcement jurisdiction of any American court, and come to any other logical conclusion than that Massaro accepted a bribe from the clearly seriously mentally ill, violent and chronically-drunk-driving alcoholic Johannah's wealthy parents. So, I am offended by the fact Massaro obviously did not read Sowerby's deposition (as he had promised to do) prior to allowing Johannah to relocate to England with Ben and Toby, thereby illegally turning to little American boys into adult Englishmen who were seriously alienated from their American father by their "deranged alcoholic" (Paul Sowerby's words) British-citizen mother. Johannah has threatened my life by phone, and has cyberstalked me for years with her unwanted and unwelcome "nastygram" emails from her imaginary Kingdom of Yr. Interested persons can read some of Johannah's lunatic emails HERE.
Another thing about Massaro which deeply offends me is that he has never apologized to David for his devastating, outcome-determining lie. That's part of why logic impels me to suspect he took a bribe from Johannah's wealthy parents. Interested persons can read the stunning facts surrounding Massaro's crimes HERE. Pretending for a moment that Massaro's lie was an "accident", logic and fairness demand recognition of the obvious fact that most decent, well-intended, emotionally well adjusted people would automatically, instantly and very sincerely apologize to their victim for such a horrific "mistake". Not Massaro. Arrogant judges don't apologize for their "mistakes". They cover them up with their self-anointed absolute judicial immunity from liability as "judicial acts" and/or "findings of the court". See, e.g. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wallace) 335 (April 8, 1872), Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). It may come as a surprise to some, but saying that 1 + 1 = 3 is NOT a "judicial act" or "finding of the court". It is a plain and simple lie. It's just that black robes, gavels, badges and guns confuse some cognitive-dissonance-afflicted people. More's the pity.
The other thing which very much offends me is then-MCDHS-caseworker, prog/lib Joni Vohs' – my research indicates that Joni, whose full name may be Joanne Marie Vohs is most likely the mother of Mesa County's infamous “Potty Peeper”, Joshua Cheyenne Vohs – disparaging and condescending attitude toward David and our parents. Say what you will about my parents and their parenting philosophies – after a 4-year stint in South Africa as dental missionaries, Mom was a career nurse at the VA, and Dad was a career maintenance worker for School District #51 -- they didn't raise any potty peepers. Prog/lib Joni also made a big deal out of the fact David (a Glade Park resident) carried a pistol under the front seat of his van for defense of his family, and did her best to use that fact to paint him as a “bad” parent. Obviously, and very much to the chagrin of prog/lib anti-gunners, David has since been completely vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
18 days – (12 hours is a felony, see C.R.S. 18-3-303(2)(b) – after feloniously falsely imprisoning David, the “system” released him so that petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in both state and federal courts would be strategically rendered moot so the legal questions about he illegal case 96-JV-180 and all orders made therein would not need to be ruled on.
I don't believe the “system” -- with the possible exception of the misandristic gender feminists at MCDHS (including the highly placed MCDHS "mole" who has a personal-friendship interest with David's crazy ex and keeps her informed as to all the latest happenings surrounding this case) -- really want to jail David for respectfully disobeying an illegal order because they know he will file more habeas petitions. Furthermore, the prisons and jails are already too overcrowded to waste time populating them with actually innocent political prisoners. So what the “system” tries to do is make life as difficult and inconvenient as humanly possible for David in hopes that he will eventually weaken, “knuckle under” (give in) and waive his legal right to contest the illegality of Case 96-JV-180 and all orders stemming therefrom. That “systemic” behavior on the part of the various individuals I shall list in a minute legally amounts to not only accessory after the fact per C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), but also deliberately criminal – (however subtle and clever it may be) – deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights per 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
The main dilemma in fighting for justice in this situation through the "normal" legal channels is that most prosecutors would most likely argue that the statute of limitations has already expired regarding the crimes committed by the various "government" individuals against David. However, the systemic corruptocratic and bureauratic ACCESSORIZATION AFTER THE FACT of those crimes continues unabated as of the writing of this exposé/essay. So the judicial crimes against my brother (and his two sons, Ben and Toby Wilkenson) continue unabated, and are ONGOING, as we speak, even though they are being systemically accessorized by different individuals than the original judicial criminals.
Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 Howard) 437 (1850):
"Jurisdiction is defined to be the power to hear and determine.... wherever a court acts without jurisdiction, its decrees, judgments, and proceedings are absolute nullities, powerless as evidence for any purpose whatever. 'They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law trespassers. This distinction runs through all the cases on the subject, and it proves that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in every other court where the proceedings of the former are relied on, and brought before the latter by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings.' Elliott et al. v. Peirsol et al., 26 U.S. (1 Peters), 340 (1828). See also 5 Cond. R. 758; 2 McLean, 477; 13 Peters, 511; and especially, Lessee of Hickey et al. v. Stewart et al., 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 762 (1845), where the whole doctrine is well laid down."
Both by case law (Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953), Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (Colo. en Banc 1951)) and by statute (C.R.S. 19-1-104(6)), Case No. 96-JV-180 and all orders, especially the 5/6/97 child support order, created in it were jurisdictionless legal nullities. It is lawfully impossible to create jurisdiction out of a legal nullity simply by "certifying" or "transferring" it over to another case (96-DR-372). By law it was (and still is) a legal nullity ab initio, so there is nothing lawfully cognizable to transfer, as then-Assistant Mesa County Attorney now-MCDC-Judge Valerie Robison obviously well knew. In fact, it is criminally inappropriate and unethical to try. Worse yet, it is prima facie criminal behavior to try to use the power of judicial office to coerce a person into waiving his legal rights to contest the issue.
The United States Supreme Court has said, "It is intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
Regarding the fact that because 96-DR-372 was under ongoing pending appeal at the Colorado Court of Appeals, Nick Massaro did not have jurisdiction over Case No. 96-DR-372 to allow Johannah to relocate in England with Ben and Toby Wilkenson, the Colorado Supreme Court case of Molitor v. Anderson, No. 89SC13, 795 P.2d 266 (1990) says in pertinent part:
"This court has previously recognized the principle that the filing of a notice of appeal divests a trial court of authority to consider matters of substance affecting directly the judgment appealed from. Schnier v. District Court, 696 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1985); McLeod v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Colo. 234, 526 P.2d 1318 (1974); Larrick v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc., 147 Colo. 133, 362 P.2d 1030 (1961); Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959); Scott v. Watkins, 61 Colo. 244, 157 P. 3 (1916); Norris v. Kelsey, 60 Colo. 297, 152 P. 1167 (1915). In Davidson v. Denver, 137 Colo. 575, 328 P.2d 377 (1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 926, 79 S.Ct. 609, 3 L.Ed.2d 629 (1959), we held that during the pendency of an appeal of a judgment the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate the judgment and conduct a new trial. Similarly, in Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo.1982), we held that during the pendency of an appeal of an order of dismissal the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate that order. While neither Davidson nor Fish involved the question of a trial court's jurisdiction to deny a motion to vacate judgment, the rationales of those decisions strongly suggest that under our procedural rules for the appeal of civil cases a trial court loses jurisdiction to consider any question concerning the substance of a final judgment after an appeal of that judgment had been perfected."
REGARDING THE SELF-EVIDENT INJUSTICE AND CRIMINALITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZING DAVID WILKENSON'S PASSPORT:
In 2009, scofflaw lawyer for the Mesa County Child Support Enforcement Unit (MCCSEU, now called "Child Support Services Division), Stuart Jones, illegally caused the seizure David Wilkenson's passport in a blatantly criminal attempt to coerce Dave into waiving his right to contest the jurisdictional issue regarding the illegal 5/6/97 support order. The absolute proof that this was a deliberately criminal act on the part of Stuart Jones is his lack of a strategic "end game".
It is self-evident that without a passport, it was impossible for Dave to visit Ben and Toby in England, where they had been illegally allowed to relocate with their dangerously disordered, violent and chronic drunk-driving mother.
The problem for Mesa County's corruptocratic judicial scofflaws is that Colorado law does not permit a non-custodial father's visiting time to be reduced or eliminated because of alleged arrearages in child support payments. See Kane v. Kane, 154 Colo. 440, 391 P.2d 361 (1964), an En Banc decision which in pertinent part says:
"Two erroneous concepts, however, are urged here.... The first one is that a trial court can punish a father, delinquent in his child support payments through no fault of his own, by denying him visitation rights until he becomes current in his payments; and, secondly, the corollary proposition that future support payments can not be reduced as long as a husband is in default, even though a proper showing can be made of inability to pay. Needless to say both of these concepts are not the law in Colorado. We can conceive of no greater cause for disharmony in human or family relationships than the application of such vindictive rules."
Precisely because Stuart Jones' illegal seizure of Dave's passport made visitation impossible, combined with the fact that Dave was paying over $1200/mo of child support at the time, the deliberately criminally illegal seizure of the passport was obviously NOT designed to coerce payment of child support, it was designed specifically and SOLELY to coerce Dave into waiving his legal rights to contest the jurisdiction of the illegal child support order upon which the child support payments were fraudulently based.
REGARDING COLORADO CONTEMPT LAW:
Colorado contempt law is primarily set forth in C.R.C.P. Rule 107 and the attendant explanatory case law (appellate court decisions). See People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1985), which in pertinent part says:
"Contempt of court can be divided into two categories, civil and criminal, dependent on the purpose and character of the sanctions sought to be imposed. People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 n. 2 (Colo.1984). Civil contempt proceedings are remedial in nature and are not intended to punish the contemner or to deter offenses against the public. Id. In contrast, criminal contempt proceedings are designed to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court by imposing punishment on the contemner. Id.
The power to punish for criminal contempt is an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independent of legislative authority, Id., at 1372, although criminal contempt is not a common law or statutory crime, id., at 1373. Procedures for prosecuting criminal contempt charges are set forth in C.R.C.P. 107(b) (contempt committed in the presence of the court) and C.R.C.P. 107(c) (contempt committed outside the presence of the court).
Courts also have the inherent and indispensable power to impose the remedial contempt sanction of imprisonment to compel performance of an act within the power of the contemner. People v. Barron, 677 P.2d at 1372 n. 2. The procedures of C.R.C.P. 107 are applicable to remedial contempt proceedings. C.R.C.P. 107(c), (d). Where such relief is sought, an adjunct criminal contempt sanction of fine or imprisonment is available to vindicate the dignity of the court if the contempt citation so states. C.R.C.P. 107(d).
In all proceedings for contempt committed out of the presence of the court, the alleged contemner must be given notice of the purpose of the hearing, including the nature of the acts of contempt that he is alleged to have committed. P.R. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 346, 350 (Colo.1981); Wright v. District Court, 192 Colo. 553, 555, 561 P.2d 15, 16-17 (1977); Ealy v. District Court, 189 Colo. 308, 310, 539 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (1975); Austin v. City & County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184-85, *975 397 P.2d 743, 746 (1964). A remedial contempt order must be supported by findings of fact establishing that the court's order has not been complied with and that the alleged contemner has the present ability to comply. Wright v. District Court, 192 Colo. at 555, 561 P.2d at 17; Marshall v. Marshall, 191 Colo. 165, 167, 551 P.2d 709, 710 (1976); Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 584, 239 P.2d 706, 708 (1951). In order to support a contempt order imposed to punish, the court must find noncompliance with the court's order and that such conduct is offensive to the authority and dignity of the court. Lobb v. Hodges, 641 P.2d 310, 311 (Colo.App.1982); Marshall v. Marshall, 35 Colo.App. 442, 445, 536 P.2d 845, 848 (1975), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 191 Colo. 165, 551 P.2d 709 (1976).
See also such cases as:
Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (1951)
District Attorney v. District Court, 150 Colo. 136, 371 P.2d 271 (1962)
Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964)
Stovall v. Crosby, 171 Colo. 70, 464 P.2d 868 (1970)
Eatchel v. Lanphere, 170 Colo. 545, 463 P.2d 457 (1970)
Harthun v. District Court, 178 Colo. 118, 495 P.2d 539 (1972)
Losavio v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973) Rule made absolute
Duran v. District Court, 190 Colo. 272, 545 P.2d 1365 (1976)
People v. Palmer, 42 Colo.App. 460, 595 P.2d 1060 (1979)
People v. Madonna, 651 P.2d 378, 388 (Colo.1982)
Dooley v. District Court, No. 90SA521, 811 P.2d 809 (1991)
Now, in 2015, scofflaw lawyer for the Mesa County Child Support Enforcement Unit (MCCSEU, now called "Child Support Services Division"), Stuart Jones' successor, Cassandra Coleman, is illegally trying to get Mesa County's scofflaw judiciary to "magically" turn the illegal 5/6/97 illegal child support order (she doesn't want to try to throw David into jail for refusing to obey) into a new updated court "command/order" which she hopes to use to throw Dave into jail for being in disobedience of the criminally abused raw contempt powers of the court. Of course, this cutesy criminal ploy is self-evidently illegal, but she is apparently confident that Mesa County's judicial scofflaws have her back in making a Writ of Habeas Corpus more difficult to obtain.
REGARDING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE:
"The U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), established clearly that prosecutors have an affirmative duty, as a matter of constitutional law, to disclose all known exculpatory evidence to the accused in a criminal proceeding. If the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to an accused, it violates due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." ~ 2009 (9) AELE Mo. L. J. 101. See also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935):
"It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which, in truth, is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured [or deliberate misstatement of the law by a judge and/or prosecutor -- JRW]. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation."
REGARDING PROBABLE CAUSE:
It is important to understand the difference between threshhold probable cause -- (actually "reasonable suspicion") -- to write a ticket, and constitutional probable cause to conduct a criminal prosecution. A policeman can reasonably believe in good faith that he has probable cause to write a ticket because, being ignorant of the facts of the case, all he knows is that the person he stopped was driving with a suspended license. BUT the prosecutor and judge, being fully aware that the order upon which the driver's license was suspended is blatantly and self-evidently illegal and a jurisdictionless legal nullity AS A MATTER OF LAW, have absolutely ZERO probable cause to pursue a criminal prosecution under those circumstances. Under the circumstances of Dave's case, prosecution constitutes an unconstitutional (due-process-violative) application of the relevant law to the facts of the case, in addition to a deliberately criminal violation of Dave's fundamental constitutional rights.
REGARDING INTENT (AKA "MENS REA") AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:
Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982):
“Rarely…will a legislative body attempt to impose the sanctions of the criminal law on the blameless. Generally, in order to subject a person to criminal liability for a felony or serious misdemeanor, there must be a concurrence of an unlawful act (actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea). E.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981).”
“Once a person is charged with violating the criminal law, basic principles of constitutional law come into play and apply throughout the prosecution of the case. It is axiomatic that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge, and this presumption extends to every element of the crime including the requisite mens rea. E.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978); Morissette v. United States, supra; People v. Hill, 182 Colo. 253, 512 P.2d 257 (1973).”
"In addition to establishing the essential elements of criminal conduct, it is within the legislature's prerogative to formulate principles of justification or excuse, usually denominated affirmative defenses, and to limit these defenses to a particular category of crimes, so long as the basic rights of the criminally accused are not thereby impaired. E.g., Patterson v. New York, supra; People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981). The formulation and the limitation of affirmative defenses, however, must be distinguished from the accused's right to present reliable and relevant evidence to controvert the prosecution's case against him. "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 312 (1973); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state statutory scheme which prevented an accused from securing coparticipant's testimony at trial denied the accused his constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor)."
"As this court observed in People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977), much more than being a mere anomaly, it would be a violation of due process to require the prosecution to establish the culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt while, at the same time, to prohibit a defendant from presenting evidence to contest this issue. Such a prohibition assumes all the features of an impermissible presumption of culpability. While it may be permissible to permit a jury to infer an essential ingredient of a crime from a proven fact so long as there is a rational connection between the proven fact and the inferred fact, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943), it is quite another matter to insulate this ingredient from disproof by defense evidence. A rule precluding the defendant from contesting the culpability element of the charge would render the prosecution's evidence on that issue uncontestable as a matter of law, in derogation of the presumption of innocence and the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 520-24, 99 S.Ct. at 2457-59, 61 L.Ed.2d at 48-51; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. at 274-75, 72 S.Ct. at 255-56, 96 L.Ed. at 306-07. "
"A statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection in common experience between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943).
In David's situation at hand, there is no rational connection between an illegal child support order and that illegal order serving as constitutionally valid probable cause that a public-safety-related driving crime has been committed.
REGARDING JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS:
Let me take off my "loyal-brother" hat and put on my "Sherlock-Holmesian-nonbar-pro-se-legal-analyst" hat for just a second.
What's actually going on with the two sides of this political contest is this:
On the one side, my brother David Wilkenson is spiritually and intellectually prepared to be wrongfully imprisoned -- (he was already falsely imprisoned by now-retired-magistrate Jane Westbrook for 18 days) -- in defense of his fundamental constitutional right to insist that Mesa County's (and, indeed, Colorado's) scofflaw judicial criminals obey the controlling Colorado law relevant to the blatantly illegal 5/6/97 child support order in Case No. 96-JV-180
When I use the phrase "spiritually prepared", I mean it in the context that Dave is a fan of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who said:
"I am asking you to fight. To fight against their anger, not provoke it. We will not strike a blow. But we will receive them. And through our pain, we will make them see their injustice. And it will hurt, as all fighting hurts. But we cannot lose. We cannot. They may torture my body, break my bones, even kill me. Then they will have my dead body, NOT my obedience."
On the other side, are some of Mesa County's "Good Old Boy" (GOB) corruptocrats -- (comprised mainly of scofflaw county commissioners and scofflaw judicial criminals) -- who seem arrogantly confident that they have each others' political backs well protected. I suspect that this latter group is operating under lawyers' advice to avoid making any kind of so-called "judicial admissions" at all costs, even if it means engaging in prima facie criminal behavior such as violating 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Simple logic suggests that Mesa County's GOB corruptocrats believe that if they stop trying to fraudulently collect matching Social Security funds based on the illegal 5/6/97 child support order, and if they dismiss Case No. 96 DR-372 on grounds that the 5/6/97 child support order at issue is a self-evident jurisdictionless legal nullity, they would be making a judicial admission that would expose them to such huge remedial and punitive liability that world class lawyers might take a serious interest in the case.
"What's a 'judicial admission?'", you might ask. Glad you asked. Here are some explanatory Colorado appellate decisions:
Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. State Division of Insurance,682 P.2d 486 (Colo.App. 1983):
"Stipulations are a form of judicial admission. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2588 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); Smith v. Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc., 82 Cal.App.3d 259, 147 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1978). Judicial admissions are binding on the party who makes them, Rosbottom v. Hensley, 61 Ill.App.2d 198, 209 N.E.2d 655 (1965); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2590 (Chadbourn rev. 1981), are evidence against such party, and may constitute the basis of a verdict. Gulley v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 73 So.2d 341 (La.Ct.App.1954)."
Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986):
"A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about which there is no real dispute. See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2588 n. 1 (Chadbourne rev. 1981). Judicial admissions are conclusive on the party making them, id.; Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. State Division of Insurance,682 P.2d 486 (Colo.App. 1983), and generally continue to have effect for a subsequent part of the same proceedings. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2593. Such admissions need not be written when made in court, nor must they be made by a party as his counsel is impliedly authorized to make them. Id. at § 2594. Generally, any fact whatever may be the subject of a judicial admission, and parties may stipulate away valuable rights, provided the court is not required to abrogate inviolate rules of public policy. Id. at § 2592."
Holiday Acres Property Owners Ass'n v. Wise, 998 P.2d 1106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000):
"A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or counsel for the party makes in a judicial proceeding. Judicial admissions are conclusive on the party making them. Such admissions may be oral or written. Any fact may be the subject of a judicial admission. Parties, by way of judicial admissions, may stipulate away valuable rights. See Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274 (Colo.1986.)"
THE GOB CRIMINAL "LEGAL" STRATEGY:
The law of the C.R.S. 42-2-138 (Driving under restraint) case against David is actually quite simple: if the illegal juridictionless legal-nullity child support order issued in the illegal C.R.S.-19-1-104(6)-violating case No. 96-JV-180 is declared by a court to be void as a jurisdictionless non-existent legal nullity as the law requires, that means the seizures of Dave's driver's license and passport were also illegal. That, in turn means that the Mesa County Department of Human Services has fraudulently scammed around $100,000 of matching Social Security funds which match the $100,000 they illegally took from David. It also means that the "driving under restraint" charges are bogus and must be dismissed AS A MATTER OF LAW.
You can see the judicial criminals' 18 U.S. Code § 242-and-18 U.S. Code § 241-violative legal strategy by the following quotes from Mesa County Judge Craig P. Henderson's comments in the 10/21/15 transcript:
"Well, what I'm saying is, is that that particular issue goes to whether or not -- I can't if that's fraud or not fraud because I have no jurisdiction over that issue at all with that particular case." (Page 28 Lines 16-20)
"-- and this is my ruling, is that I cannot do that because I cannot make a determination whether it's fraudulent or not fraudulent. That's already a done deal from my perspective, as a County Court Judge." (Page 29 Lines 14-18)
"Now this is what would happen if I ruled against the People, I believe. I believe that we would be right back here again, and I would be shot down. And that's where we would be." (Page 31 Lines 15-18)
"What he's doing is basically a -- entering a nullification type situation, which I cannot allow because, you know, this court has ruled I don't have jurisdiction over the JV case, and in the JV case I cannot make the determination, and I will not, because I don't know anything about it, and that those two cases -- I don't know why the judge ruled the way they did. I don't know what evidence was presented. And that is well past the time frame for any kind of appeal." (Page 36 Lines 4-12)
It's important for the public to understand the crime which is being perpetrated here, and fortunately even a layperson can understand the basics.
It is logically self-evident that if the order upon which the seizure of Dave's license and passport were based was illegal, then those seizures were also illegal. It logically follows that if those seizures were illegal, then it is impossible for Dave to be guilty of driving with a LAWFULLY suspended driver's license. In other words, in plain and simple language, if the order is illegal, then Dave is innocent of the C.R.S. 42-2-138 (Driving under restraint) charge against him AS A MATTER OF LAW, without the necessity of wasting the public's money on a full-blown trial in which the judge cleverly tries to conceal the exculpatory truth from a well-intended-but-gullible fact-deprived jury.
Intent (mens rea) is an indispensable element of guilt in a C.R.S. 42-2-138 (Driving under restraint) prosecution. See Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1987), Barnes v. People, 735 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1987) and Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982).
A jury gets to decide the facts of a case, and the court expounds on the law as it relates to the facts so long as no rule of law is incorrectly stated. See, e.g.:
Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. (4 Peters) 1 (1830)
Magniac v. Thompson, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 348 (1833)
Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Peters) 80 (1836)
Games v. Stiles, 39 U.S. 322 (1840)
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 Howard) 115 (1851)
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426 (1875)
Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297 (1877)
Vicksburg & Meridian R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545 (1886)
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Vickers, 122 U.S. 360 (1887)
United States v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 123 U.S. 113 (1887)
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888)
Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U.S. 171 (1888)
Rucker v. Wheeler, 127 U.S. 85 (1888)
Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 (1894)
Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920).
In the case of Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982), a different Colorado Supreme Court than the one which refused to stop Nick Massaro from illegally allowing two of David's sons from relocating to England outside the enforcement jurisdiction of American courts in direct violation of Colorado law and Colorado public policy, said:
“Rarely…will a legislative body attempt to impose the sanctions of the criminal law on the blameless. Generally, in order to subject a person to criminal liability for a felony or serious misdemeanor, there must be a concurrence of an unlawful act (actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea). E.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981).”
“Once a person is charged with violating the criminal law, basic principles of constitutional law come into play and apply throughout the prosecution of the case. It is axiomatic that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge, and this presumption extends to every element of the crime including the requisite mens rea. E.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978); Morissette v. United States, supra; People v. Hill, 182 Colo. 253, 512 P.2d 257 (1973).”
"In addition to establishing the essential elements of criminal conduct, it is within the legislature's prerogative to formulate principles of justification or excuse, usually denominated affirmative defenses, and to limit these defenses to a particular category of crimes, so long as the basic rights of the criminally accused are not thereby impaired. E.g., Patterson v. New York, supra; People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo.1981). The formulation and the limitation of affirmative defenses, however, must be distinguished from the accused's right to present reliable and relevant evidence to controvert the prosecution's case against him." "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 312 (1973); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state statutory scheme which prevented an accused from securing coparticipant's testimony at trial denied the accused his constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor)."
"As this court observed in People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977), much more than being a mere anomaly, it would be a violation of due process to require the prosecution to establish the culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt while, at the same time, to prohibit a defendant from presenting evidence to contest this issue. Such a prohibition assumes all the features of an impermissible presumption of culpability. While it may be permissible to permit a jury to infer an essential ingredient of a crime from a proven fact so long as there is a rational connection between the proven fact and the inferred fact, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943), it is quite another matter to insulate this ingredient from disproof by defense evidence. A rule precluding the defendant from contesting the culpability element of the charge would render the prosecution's evidence on that issue uncontestable as a matter of law, in derogation of the presumption of innocence and the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 520-24, 99 S.Ct. at 2457-59, 61 L.Ed.2d at 48-51; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. at 274-75, 72 S.Ct. at 255-56, 96 L.Ed. at 306-07."
Obviously, Judge Henderson's criminal strategy of withholding exculpatory information from the jury (while pretending that is not what he is doing) to achieve an unjust and illegal outcome in a criminal prosecution is in direct violation of Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982) and the cases cited therein. The problem is, appeal would be useless, because Colorado's appellate courts have been covering up the judicial felonies discussed in this exposé. The entire Colorado court system is completely broken. Hence this direct POLITICAL appeal to Colorado's citizenry.
WHY I BELIEVE THE LOCAL LEGAL "COMMUNITY" IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JUDICIAL CRIMINALS:
One of Dave's lawyers -- (a local person who shall remain unnamed for fear of judicial retribution) -- became concerned because Mesa County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) had not given him a copy of the relevant child support order two and a half months after he had contacted MSDHS and asked for it. Additionally, MCDHS would not answer any of his questions about his other clients involved at MCDHS. In effect, MCDHS had blackballed Dave's lawyer for daring to ask for a copy of the illegal 5/6/97 child support order. This made the lawyer suspect that no order existed.
The same lawyer told Dave that if he went into court and filed a pleading contesting the jurisdictional validity of that 5/6/97 child support order, he would be summarily called in before the chief judge of the Mesa County District Court (MCDC), threatened, fined $3,000, and forced to attend (at his own expense) continuing education classes concerning what types of motions are appropriate to file in court.
Courts do not allow lawyers to make judges look bad. Because judges had already ruled on the order in question, the unspoken (but very REAL) rule is that lawyers are not allowed to challenge those types of rulings, even if/when those rulings are criminally fraudulent deliberate misstatements of the law. Lawyers' livelihoods are very literally held hostage to this real-but-unspoken rule.
This is why a good lawyer won't/can't do the things he or she needs to do to win for a deserving client who is being screwed over by the system. This is also why the system routinely, and with impunity, commits the crimes it does: it knows the judges have their backs.
Here is why I say the entire legal "community" -- (remember Rose Pugliese, Scott McInnis, Representative Yeulin Willett and Sentinel pundit Rick "The War On Wrong" Wagner are all lawyers) -- is responsible for the blatant and arrogant criminality of its (relevant-to-this-case) judges:
Judges' Oath of Office:
" I,______ do solemnly swear by the everliving God, that I will
support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Colorado, and faithfully perform the duties of
the office of _____ upon which I am about to enter."
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (Colo. RPC 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct):
"(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
(b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority."
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (Colo. RPC 8.4. Misconduct):
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law."
Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct:
Canon 1 Rule 1.1 Compliance with the law:
"(A) A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.
(B) Conduct by a judge that violates a criminal law may, unless the violation is minor, constitute a violation of the requirement that a judge must comply with the law."
Canon 1 Rule 1.2: Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary
"A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."
Canon 2 Rule 2.2 Impartiality and Fairness:
"A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially."
Canon 2 Rule 2.6 Ensuring the Right to Be Heard:
"(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law."
Canon 2 Rule 2.15 Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct:
"(A) A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question regarding the judge’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.
(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.
(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.
(D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action."
For those judges and lawyers who are aware of the "accessorized" 18 U.S. Code § 242-and-18 U.S. Code § 241-violative judicial crimes being committed against Dave -- (and there are some) -- I respectfully suggest that, in addition to being in violation of their own professional ethics, they are also in ongoing violation of 18 U.S. Code § 4 - Misprision of felony and C.R.S. § 18-8-115. Duty to report a crime.
THE GOB CRIMINAL POLITICAL STRATEGY:
Of course, if the scofflaw GOB judicial criminals on my list below decide they want to jail Dave, they don't want to create an appearance that David is engaging in fully-justifiable Henry-David-Thoreau-like act of civil disobedience by courteously refusing to obey a prima-facie illegal jurisdictionless order. They want it to look like he's a scofflaw "deadbeat dad" who is chronically driving with a "legally" suspended driver's license and without insurance. That way the public will be tricked into wrongly believing that Dave is a scofflaw who belongs in prison, when the truth of the matter is that the judicial criminals are the REAL scofflaws who justifiably belong in prison. They are the REAL traitors to the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions, not to mention Rule of Law.
It is their apparent intent to not allow Dave to present the illegal, jurisdictionless and void 5/6/97 child support order to the jury as evidence. It is their apparent intent to not allow him to raise the illegality of the order upon which his driver's license and passport were unconstitutionally seized as an affirmative defense. It is their apparent intent to not let him talk about such things as C.R.S. 19-1-104(6), Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953), and Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (Colo. en Banc 1951), Ex Parte Fisk, 113 US 713 (1885) and Thrap v People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P2d 576 (Colo, January 10, 1977).
It is their apparent intent to obstruct justice by deliberately deceiving a jury into handing down a conviction based on an incorrect legal basis. The order upon which David is being illegally prosecuted is void ab initio AS A MATTER OF LAW. The scofflaw judges don't want to rule on it, because a ruling is appealable. Throughout the entire case, the various scofflaw judges have manipulated it in such a was as to make meaningful appeal impossible. It is the apparent intent of the relevant scofflaw judges to deliberately give knowingly false jury instructions.
In pertinent part, the case of U.S. v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1991):
“The jury should have been instructed in a way that there was no possibility that the conviction was based on an incorrect legal basis. The questions from the jury certainly pointed up the problem. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946). Absent such an instruction, "[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the jury may have convicted on an improper basis." Kline, 922 F.2d at 613; see also United States v. Munz, 504 F.2d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 1974); Michaud v. United States, 350 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1965).”
Contrary to controlling law, it is the apparent intent of the scofflaw judges to deliberately deceive a jury into rendering a conviction based on both an incorrect legal and incorrect political basis.
LIST OF PEOPLE WHO, IN MY OPINION, DESERVE TO DO SOME PRISON TIME:
Before you rush to the conclusion that I'm being harsh when I say the following people should spend some time in prison, let me recap what they did. In blunt language, the cumulative effect of their crimes was to illegally send two little American boys, Ben and Toby Wilkenson, to England with a clearly seriously mentally ill, chronic-drunk-driving alcoholic British-citizen mother who has at no time obeyed any part of the final parenting time order, and who has engaged in the most severe parental alienation possible against Dave. The last time Dave saw Ben and Toby, they were 2 and 3 years old. They are now 20 and 21. Through the unarguably criminal behavior of various named people below, David, in DELIBERATE violation of is most fundamental rights, was completely deprived of watching and helping Ben and Toby grow up. So two little American boys were forced by various judicial criminals, including those on the Colorado Court of Appeals who destroyed the entire record of the case to cover up the lower-level judicial felonies, to become adult Englishmen who have no relationship with their American father. Every effort is made by the various criminals listed below to keep any and all information about Ben and Toby from Dave. Dave has twice filed for the statutory change of custody he is entitled to. But he was denied both times, once by Jane Westbrook and once by Stephanie Rubenstein for the unspoken reason that a change of custody would have been unenforceable and would have exposed the original crime of illegally sending Ben and Toby to England for exactly what it was: a viciously evil and calculated crime.
And, by all means, let's don't forget the over $100,000 illegally scammed from Social Security in the form of matching funds approximately equal to the $100,000 illegally taken from Dave. So, yes, in my view, people definitely need to go to prison for this travesty of justic so there will be a meaningful and effective deterrent against future such criminal shenanigans.
Nicholas Massaro -- Violated his oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4) and Colorado's Code of Judicial Conduct. Acted as referral source in his own jurisdictionless case No. 96-JV-180. Created 96-JV-180 in direct violation of C.R.S. 19-1-104(6) and Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953). Kept the report of Johannah Wilkenson's DUI probation violation from DUI judge Art Smith for 6 months, allowing Johannah to leave the United States knowing full well that she was in violation of her probation. Allowed Johannah to leave the United States with Ben and Toby Wilkenson while the divorce case was under ongoing appeal. Interested persons can read the stunning facts surrounding Massaro's arrogant crimes HERE. -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-13-105 Criminal defamation, C.R.S. 18-8-114. Abuse of public records, C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), C.R.S. 18-3-303 (False imprisonment), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Jane Westbrook -- Violated her oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4) and Colorado's Code of Judicial Conduct. Falsified the register of actions to cover up for deliberate due process violations. Withheld records from the court file to manipulate then-magistrate Cynthia Cyphers into making erroneous legal decisions based on false facts related to the 18-day false imprisonment of David Wilkenson. Made knowingly false statements of fact in issuing her court orders. -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-3-303 (False imprisonment), C.R.S. 18-8-114. Abuse of public records, C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Cynthia Cyphers -- Violated her oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4) and Colorado's Code of Judicial Conduct. Predated court orders and falsified the register of actions to cover up for the illegal 18-day jailing of David Wilkenson. -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-3-303 (False imprisonment), C.R.S. 18-8-114. Abuse of public records, C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Thomas Michael Deister -- Violated his oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4), Colorado's Code of Judicial Conduct, and C.R.S. 13-17-102(6) -- lied about Dave's pleadings being "frivolous and vexatious" and illegally assessed attorney-fee sanctions against Dave on three separate occasions in an attempt to intimidate David -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Christine M. Arguello -- Violated her oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4) and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges -- acted as accessory after the fact in the judicial crimes committed against Dave, and actually had the chutzpah to "dismiss with prejudice" the issue of the self-evident deprivations of Dave's most fundamental constitutional rights by the state judicial criminals -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Cassandra Coleman -- Violated her oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4) -- fraudulently attempted to replace the 5/6/97 legal nullity order with an order not based on Colorado statutes, but based on the raw contempt powers of the courts -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Rose Pugliese -- Violated her oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4). -- pretends the Board of Mesa County Commissioners doesn't have oversight power over MCDHS and its Child Support Enforcement Unit when in fact it sits as the MCDHS Board and has the power to fire the head of DHS (Tracey Garchar), hides behind the county attorney, thus criminally accessorizing the original judicial felonies -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Scott McInnis -- Violated his oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4) -- pretends the Board of Mesa County Commissioners doesn't have oversight power over MCDHS and its Child Support Enforcement Unit when in fact it sits as the MCDHS Board and has the power to fire the head of DHS (Tracey Garchar), hides behind the county attorney, thus criminally accessorizing the original judicial felonies -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
John Justman -- Violated his oath of office. -- pretends the Board of Mesa County Commissioners doesn't have oversight power over MCDHS and its Child Support Enforcement Unit when in fact it sits as the MCDHS Board and has the power to fire the head of DHS (Tracey Garchar), hides behind the county attorney, thus criminally accessorizing the original judicial felonies -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Catherine Burkey -- Violated her oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4). -- Burkey knew that Johannah was in violation of her DUI probation, but she kept that information from then-Judge Art Smith, and ostensibly conspired with Nick Massaro to keep that information from Art Smith until Johannah had left the United States. Interested persons can read about some of Burkey's unethical manipulations I like to refer to as "Burkeyball" HERE.
Pete Hautzinger -- Violated his oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4). -- Dave reported in writing to Hautzinger that the court record in 96-DR-372 had been falsified and destroyed. Dave asked Hautzinger to either 1) investigate and prosecute those responsible for the falsification and destruction, or 2) refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney for Colorado. Hautzinger did not respond, but apparently made the unspoken choice to enable and accessorize the judicial felonies. Some crime fighter. Well, maybe it's just judicial felonies he doesn't want to fight. This is who your new Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western Slope is, folks! -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Maurice "Lyle" Dechant -- Violated his oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4). -- Ostensibly orchestrated and directed the fraudulent prosecution of the jurisdictionless legal-nullity 5/6/97 child support order as a way of trying to waste David's time in opposing a fraudulent bad-faith prosecution so he wouldn't have time to make a proper record of all his defenses and objections in the case. -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Stuart Jones -- Violated his oath of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4). -- Six years after Jane Westbrook's false imprisonment of Dave, Stuart Jones initiated child support collection using the jurisdictionless legal-nullity 5/6/97 child support order which he knew full well was illegal on its face AS A MATTER OF LAW. While illegally collecting child support, Jones illegally had Dave's passport illegally seized in an illegal attempt to deprive Dave of access to his two boys in England in an illegal attempt to coerce Dave into waiving his legal rights to contest the jurisdictional invalidity of the jurisdictionless legal-nullity 5/6/97 child support order. -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Unknown/unnamed person/s at the Colorado Court of Appeals -- Violated their oaths of office and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (particularly Colo. RPC 8.3 and Colo. RPC 8.4). -- illegally destroyed the entire record of Case No. 96-DR-372 in an attempt to cover-up the original judicial crimes. -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-8-610 (Tampering with physical evidence - a Class 6 felony), C.R.S. 18-2-201 (Conspiracy), C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights). This is serious obstruction of justice.
Unknown/unnamed person/s at the Mesa County Department of Human Services' - Child Support Services Division -- Violated their oaths of office and are the instigators of using the jurisdictionless legal-nullity 5/6/97 child support order to illegally seize funds from David's bank account, to illegally make false reports to Dave's creditors, to illegally seize Dave's driver's license and passport, and to illegally scam matching funds from Social Security -- Relevant criminal law: C.R.S. 18-2-201 Conspiracy, C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights).
Johannah Clare Wilkenson (née Taylor) (or whatever her name is now) -- Davids nattering nabob of nuttiness and clearly disordered, violent, chronic drunk driving alcoholic ex-wife -- criminal conspiracy (C.R.S. §18-2-201) criminal defamation (C.R.S. §18-13-105) and criminal false reporting (C.R.S. §18-8-111) to the MCDHS in a wannabe-clever effort to secretly “tweak” the government players behind the scenes against David in their divorce case. Because she is a British citizen living in England, she doesn't really belong on this list, she belongs in an asylum. All you need to know about her you can read in the 180-page deposition of Paul Sowerby and in this exposé and in her emails from her imaginary Kingdom of Yr.
Anita Lea Baillie (née Wilkenson) -- my sister, and second oldest of five siblings -- criminal conspiracy (C.R.S. §18-2-201) criminal defamation (C.R.S. §18-13-105) and criminal false reporting (C.R.S. §18-8-111) to the MCDHS in a wannabe-clever effort to secretly “tweak” the government players behind the scenes against David in his divorce case. Anita was neither physically nor sexually abused by our parents when we were children. Interested persons can read the truth about our father's child disciplining philosophy and habits HERE.
Daniel Allen Wilkenson -- my brother, and second youngest of five siblings -- criminal conspiracy (C.R.S. §18-2-201) criminal defamation (C.R.S. §18-13-105) and criminal false reporting (C.R.S. §18-8-111) to the MCDHS in a wannabe-clever effort to secretly “tweak” the government players behind the scenes against David in his divorce case. Daniel was neither physically nor sexually abused by our parents when we were children. Interested persons can read the truth about our father's child disciplining philosophy and habits HERE. Interested persons can also read about Daniel's lying manipulations and how he kicked our own parents out of "his" church HERE and HERE
John Vieira -- third ex-husband of my sister Anita. Interested persons can read about his criminal conspiracy (C.R.S. §18-2-201) and perjury (C.R.S. §18-8-502) in a wannabe-clever effort to secretly “tweak” the government players against David in his divorce case HERE.
THE ENABLERS OF JUDICIAL CRIMINALITY:
All Mesa County Commissioners, going back to when my first cousin, Jim Baughman, was a commissioner, actually belong on my list of people who I believe should serve some prison time. They all enabled and pooh-poohed the serious ongoing crimes being perpetrated against Dave at the time. My cousin Jim is a basically good, decent and honest man -- one of the most constitution-friendly people to ever sit on the board. I just believe he was too ignorant in the law and too intellectually lazy to want to know the whole truth about the serious crimes which were being perpetrated against Dave during his time in office. Since this is a political/opinion exposé, I can't see any good purpose in naming all the names going all the way to the board consisting of Doralyn Genova, Cathy Hall and Jim Baughman. I do, however, suspect that Genova, Hall and the county attorney at that time persuaded Jim that he would look stupid if he tried to do anything about the crimes being perpetrated against Dave. That Jim was apparently more concerned with not looking foolish than he was with opposing the serious crimes which were being perpetrated against his cousin, Dave, does Jim no great honor.
Most of my extended family were also enablers by their silence. All but one of the so-called "Big 10" (my mother's siblings) are now deceased. But while they were alive, one of them actually ridiculed my plea for help by calling it "Johnny's Opus". Nor has my generation of cousins (aka the "Little 23") taken an interest in exposing injustice. The maxim of the law is "qui tacet consentit videtur" (he who is silent is taken to agree). However, I don't blame them. They were faced with an impossible choice between two hideous evils: either 1) my dad was a sexual abuser and both Mom and Dad were physical abusers, or 2) my sister Anita was a lying manipulator who used the common feminazi strategy ploy of falsely accusing her own innocent father of sexual abuse just so she could "tweak" the government players behind the scenes -- neither Anita or Dan ever dreamed that their lies and manipulations would be made public -- to destroy her brother Dave in a hideously acrimonious divorce from his dangerously disordered and chronically drunk driving ex-wife. What decent person of traditional family values in his or her right mind would want to think such a horrible thing about an uncle/brother-in-law or a niece/cousin? Nobody. So I don't blame them all that much for shrinking from unbearable ugliness. But their silence DID help enable systemic evil, so, with a few exceptions (they know who they are), I'm not all that proud of them either.
ON JURY NULLIFICATION:
When fighting against systemic GOB corruption and criminality of the mind-boggling immensity which exist in my brother's case, the only two logical strategies with come readily to mind are recall elections and so-called "jury nullification2".
In the case of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 1 (1794), America's first chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John Jay, said the following (which appears to now be omitted by Justia and Findlaw):
"It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumeable, that the court are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision."
Clearly, a jury of one's peers has the raw power -- (I would say "right", but corruptocrat judges would disagree, see Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)) -- to simply acquit an accused person they believe the government is wrongfully and unconstitutionally prosecuting in clear violation of the Rule of Law.
Fairness and truth, however, demand recognition of the fact, that in this particular situation, there is no need for "jury nullification" of what a jury deems to be either an unjust law or an unjust application of a law when that application is taken in proper context. In this case, what lying judicial criminals would try to get a reasonable person to believe amounts to "jury nullification" is merely a moral rejection by a jury of a lying judge's intentional misstatement of what the law actually is. There is, of course, a night-versus-day difference between the two concepts.
It is my sincere hope that the citizenry of Mesa County -- especially the families of the countless individuals who have been screwed over by MCDHS and local family courts -- will rise up and vigorously oppose the prima-facie criminal acts of lying judicial criminals by refusing to be part of the criminal pretense that an illegal, jurisdictionless and void child support order can be used as lawful probable cause for seizing a father's driver's license and passport solely for the blatantly unconstitutional reason -- [18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights)] -- of trying to make his life so extremely difficult that he will allow himself to be criminally coerced into waiving his fundamental constitutional rights.
ON RECALL ELECTIONS:
When faced with such pervasive corruption and systemic criminal behavior as currently exist in Mesa County, aside from jury nullification, in my opinion, the only practical means of resistance is to recall a bunch of GOB-friendly politicians en masse to demonstrate to both the "government" and the citizenry that it can in fact be done. I discussed how that can be done in my essay titled How to take Mesa County back from the Good Old Boy gang precinct by precinct -- Politics 101"
In the instant situation, the law couldn't be clearer: Jane Westbrook's 5/6/97 Support Order was, and is, illegal, jurisdictionless and 100% void. Not merely "voidable" or "transferable" but void altogether from it's very inception. so the problem isn't a "legal" problem. It's a POLITICAL problem.
To run a successful recall campaign, you need about 150-200 what I call "boots on the ground" people to gather signatures and distribute hard-copy political literature to the home of every registered voter in the county. You also need a declaration of the reason why you are waging the recall contest, and candidates to replace those whom you are trying to recall.
If we can't find an excellent younger candidate in John Justman's district, I, at 71 years of age, would cheerfully volunteer because I live in his district. (Besides, I didn't like the cutesy way he responded to Kevin King at a commissioners' meeting. See at about 7:35 of the video.) That means we would still need volunteer candidates to replace lawyers Rose Pugliese and Scott McInnis.
My qualifications are that I was born in Mesa County, have lived here most of my life, care very deeply about her, and I understand (and know how to research) the law. As a nonbar pro se litigant, I organized both the legal and political campaigns which resulted in a victory in John R. Wilkenson, et al., v. United States Dept. of Interior, et al., 634 FS 1265, in which we prevailed on every point we raised, and in which we won a permanent injunction against federal interference with the public right of way for ingress and egress between Glade Park and the rest of the outside world. In that case, I had to extensively research the law, read every relevant document in the Colorado National Monument files at the time, and organize the political demonstrations.
Thankfully, I was able to convince Gene Vories and Dick Pond as to the legal correctness of my position. Without their help, I don't believe we could have won. As retribution for his help, the local GOB corruptocrats used corrupt banking laws to "reassess the equity position" of Gene's loan/s, call the whole note immediately due, and thereby steal Gene's ranch and 23-employee plumbing supply business even though Gene had never missed or been late with a single payment in his life.
If elected, I would promise several things: 1) I would be an Oath Keeper and keep my oath to uphold the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions, 2) complete transparency -- whether you agree with me or disagree with me, voters will ALWAYS know EXACTLY why I support or oppose any given idea, policy or project, 3) I will NEVER hide behind lawyers to avoid accountability for my decisions or behavior, and 4) I despise the local GOB corruptocrats/bureaurats and, for philosophical and moral reasons, have ZERO interest in their dishonest money. To paraphrase the words of Scott Nearing, if you offered me a huge sum of money and told me to buy whatever I wanted, I would say: "There's nothing I want, there's nothing I need. My food needs are met, my housing needs are met, my clothing needs are met, my health needs are met, my transportation needs are met, my fuel needs are met. There isn't anything that I want. Although I am not remotely rich in money, I am extremely rich in friends and in the unmerited favor of my Creator. So there isn't anything I want which might make me vulnerable to Mesa County's GOB corruptocrats."
Of course, it goes without saying that I can't win this political contest all by myself. If the citizenry of Mesa County is so apathetic toward rampant "Good Old Boy" crime that we can't manage to muster 150-200 steel-spined hardcore activists determined to put an end to the local culture of GOB corruption, then, to paraphrase the words of Mahatma Gandhi, perhaps the best protest the people of Mesa County are capable of mounting at this time is for David Wilkenson to endure unjust imprisonment until the GOB criminals (my opinion) who put him there decide to let him out.
I didn't want or ask to be forced into writing this exposé. I take no pleasure in it. I have no malice toward anyone. I hold sincere hope for the repentance and redemption of every person. Per 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony) and C.R.S. § 18-8-115 (Duty to report a crime), I am simply making a political/opinion report of serious crimes to the people, in whom, per Article 1, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution, ALL political power is vested. I simply believe that the public deserves to know the truth about the criminal behavior of their so-called "servants" and that Colorado's entire judicial system is completely broken to the point where justice, righteousness, and Rule of Law are a total crap shoot. I would be ashamed to be a lawyer in Colorado, knowing first hand the brokenness of Colorado's courts.
All it takes for evil to prosper is for good people to do nothing under the pretense of “neutrality” or “ignorance.” Because inaction in the face of evil is taking the side of evil, like Dr. Alexandre Manette in Charles Dickens’s "A Tale of Two Cities", who was secretly imprisoned for 18 years in the Bastille for daring -- despite his awareness of “court influence” and the immunity of nobles -- to write a letter to a minister of the court detailing the wrongs done by the evil Marquis St. Evrémonde and his brother, I feel compelled to write the whole truth as I know it, and let the chips fall where they may.
It seems appropriate to paraphrase Dr. Alexandre Manette:
“If it had pleased God to put in the hard hearts of all the liars, manipulators, and unethical ‘professionals,’ in all the these frightful years, to grant my brother David any shred of local, state, or federal procedural due process, any shred of equal protection of law, or any shred of substantive factual truth, I might have thought that He (God) had not quite given up on them. But now I believe the diseases of deception, manipulation, and false pride are fatal to their eternal souls, and that they have chosen to place themselves outside His mercies."
"Thankfully, only God can be the true and final judge of that. Accordingly, I, John R. Wilkenson, unhappy recipient of unfair demonization, do this tenth month of the year 2015, in my unbearable agony of being forced to watch the destruction of my family, denounce to the times when all these things shall be answered for. I denounce them to Heaven and to earth.”
Based upon the above-stated TRUTH, it seems also seems appropriate to encourage my brother David with a prayer from the much persecuted prophet Jeremiah 20:10-11: “For I have heard many whispering and defaming, [There is] terror on every side! Denounce him! Let us denounce him! Say all my familiar friends, they who watch for my fall. Perhaps he will be persuaded and deceived; then we will prevail against him, and we will get our revenge on him. But the Lord is with me as a mighty and terrible One; therefore my persecutors will stumble, and they will not overcome [me]. They will utterly be put to shame, for they will not deal wisely or prosper [in their schemes]; their eternal dishonor will never be forgotten."
(NOTE: Article 2, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution says in pertinent part: “Freedom of speech and press…every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, ... and in all suits and prosecutions of libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.” The foregoing exposé is 100% political speech aimed at exposing judicial criminals and correcting a serious systemic problem. While the material is the author’s 1st-Amendment-protected opinion, it is also the truth, so help me God. See also the legal disclaimer for this website.)
STATE COURT DOCUMENTS:
(NOTE: There are literally scores of documents filed in the state court regarding the cases No. 96-JV-180 and No. 96-DR-372. Below are just a few of the most recent and most relevant since they involve the criminal cover up of the judicial felonies perpetrated against David Wilkenson and not merely a boring acrimonious divorce case (of which there are thousands everyday in America. Putting them all online (which I intend to do at some point) will require changing the format from Samna AmiPro (later Lotus WordPro) to MS Word, editing them for typos, turning them into PDF files and posting them online. There wasn't enough time to do that before this exposé became timely.)
1997-09-24 Assistant Mesa County Attorney Valerie Robison's Motion To Clarify The Order Certifying The Custody Action To Juvenile Action; Objection To Motion To Determine Child Support - (NOTE: Valerie Robison is currently a Mesa County District Court judge, and was, as you can see from her objection to determining child support in the juvenile case, fully aware of the judicial crimes being perpetrated against Dave at the time.)
2014-02-11 Mandate of the Colorado Court of Appeals (dismissing David E. Wilkenson's appeal with prejudice).
2015-08-31 Order Regarding Child Support Arrears Payment (NOTE: Compare Magistrate McNulty's order with the truth of Magistrate Westbrook's 1997-05-06 support order originally illegally made in Case No. 96-JV-180
2015-07-22 Verified Motion To Dismiss The C.R.S. 42-2-138 Driving While Under Suspension Charge; And To Find That C.R.S. 42-2-127.5 Is Unconstitutional Both As Written And As Applied To The Facts Of This Case
FEDERAL COURT DOCUMENTS:
2013-06-25 Response To Motion To Dismiss - This response crossed in the mails with the Court's 2013-06-24 order. It was mailed prior to receipt of the 2013-06-24 order.
2013-12-16 Notice of Monthly Support Obligation - (NOTE: This document is proof that Colorado has doubled down on the 18-USC-§241-violative (federal-felony) behavior of two of its judicial officers and is still trying to illegally collect child support for Ben Wilkenson, who turned 20 on December 10, 2013.)
2014-01-03 Verified Objection, and Response to the Magistrates 12/16/13 Recommendation; Motion for Review of Magistrate's Recommendation by the Presiding Judge - (NOTE: there were some typographical errors on pages 12-13 of this pleading which were corrected by the following "Notice of Harmless Error".
VIDEOS (FATHERS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN FAMILY COURT):
At first glance it might seem to some as though this aggregation of videos related to the misandristic lawlessness pandemic in family courts is irrelevant to this exposé. However, such is clearly not the case. It is an easily proven fact that, as a practical matter, there is no law in family courts, only what an anarchistic judge wants to do. My brother's case serves as conclusive proof of that FACT. The law is utterly irrelevant. As a so-called "men's rights" -- (actually more correctly constitutional due process and equal protection of law for all) -- activist, I find that situation to be TOTALLY unacceptable. Since arrogant judicial criminality is at the very core of Dave's case, it seemed both reasonable and desirable to include an aggregation of videos which support both the spirit and intent of my political/opinion exposé.
Divorce Corp Film Trailer (Documentary) - YouTube Video
Divorce Corp Film: All Powerful Judges (Documentary) - YouTube Video - "There is no law in family court. There's only what the judge wants to do. Period." ~ Bonnie Russell (Family Law Reform Advocate)
"All judges have the same middle name: 'God'" ~ Gerald Nissenbaum (Boston attorney
Divorce Corp Film - False Child Abuse Claims (Documentary) - YouTube Video
Family Court - the Source of the Corruption - YouTube Video
Family Court - The Horrors of Divorce for Men - YouTube Video
Family - Fathers' Rights - 1/3 - YouTube Video
Family - Fathers' Rights - 2/3 - YouTube Video
Family - Fathers' Rights - 3/3 - YouTube Video
Richard I Fine Win's His Freedom Part 1 of 6 - YouTube Video
Richard I Fine Win's His Freedom Part 2 of 6 - YouTube Video
Richard Fine "coercive confinement" Inmate Abuse Part 3 of 6 - YouTube Video
Richard I Fine Win's His Freedom Part 4 of 6 - YouTube Video
Richard I Fine Win's His Freedom Part 5 of Six - YouTube Video
Richard I Fine Win's His Freedom Part 6 of Six - YouTube Video
How To Disqualify Your Judge www.fulldisclosure.net - YouTube Video
Dr Helen Smith Explains Why Men Need To Boycott Marriage Until Laws Change! - YouTube Video - Interview with psychologist Dr. Helen Smith, author of "Men on Strike: Why Men Are Boycotting Marriage, Fatherhood, and the American Dream - and Why It Matters"
Richard Fine: His Darkest Moment in the LA County Jail - YouTube Video
Why Won't the ACLU Help Jailed Attorney Richard Fine? - YouTube Video
Richard I Fine Torture Complaint Filed With United Nations - YouTube Video
Cost Of Courage, The Story Of Richard I Fine #585-587 - YouTube Video
1. Merely for refusing to waive his legal and fundamental constitutional rights under the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments to demand that the various government entities obey such on-point controlling Colorado law as:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
C.R.S. 19-1-104(6), C.R.S 19-3-308, C.R.S. 19-3-501, C.R.S. 19-3-505 and C.R.Juv.P. Rule 4.4(a), Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953), In re Marriage of Pote, 847 P.2d 246 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), In re Marriage of Redford, 776 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), Molitor v. Anderson, No. 89SC13, 795 P.2d 266 (1990), Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361 (1964), Holland v. Holland, 150 Colo. 442, 373 P 2d 523 (1962), McGonigle v. McGonigle, 112 Colo. 569, 151 P.2d 977 (1944), Tanttila v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 445, 382 P.2d 798. (1963), Harvey v. Harvey, 153 Colo. 15, 384 P.2d 265 (1963), In re Popejoy, 26 Colo. 32, 55 P. 1083 (1899), Abbott v. People, 91 Colo. 510, 16 P.2d 435, 436 (Colo. En Banc 1932), Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 5 P.2d 246, 248, 78 A.L.R. 313 (1931), McChesney v. McChesney, 103 Colo. 115, 83 P.2d 772, 773 (1935), Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235; 179 P.2d 662 (1947), Arnett v. Northern et al., 118 Colo. 307 (1948) No. 15,845, Supreme Co 118 Colo. 307 (1948), Murley v. Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (Colo. en Banc 1951). (Murley can also be found HERE. In pertinent part, Murley says:
"The situation before us poses a still more difficult question. We must note that this is not a proceeding in divorce or in equity concerning custody and support of a child, but a proceeding in the juvenile court. As we said in Abbott v. People, 91 Colo. 510, 16 P.2d 435, 436: "The juvenile court is not a constitutional court. It is a court created by statute, and possesses only such powers as the statute properly confers upon it." It has not been given jurisdiction to determine the relative rights of custody or support in an issue between the father and mother. Where such an issue existed in the district court, we said in Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 5 P.2d 246, 248, 78 A.L.R. 313, "The proceedings in the two courts are between different parties. Dependency proceedings are required to be entitled `The People, in the interest of the child, * * * and concerning' a named respondent." "In a divorce suit, on the other hand, the parties of record are the husband and the wife * * *. The jurisdiction of the divorce court is exercised as between the husband and the wife; that of the juvenile court `as between the state, or, so to speak, the child, and the parents of the child.'" In the divorce proceeding, the court determines which of the parents is better qualified to have custody. In the dependency proceeding, "we are concerned only with the question of whether the evidence discloses a situation such that the state is warranted in assuming control and guardianship of the minor, and not with the relative qualifications of the father and mother to have his custody." McChesney v. McChesney, 103 Colo. 115, 83 P.2d 772, 773. Only when a child has been adjudged dependent and its control assumed by the state does the juvenile court determine the question of its custody and such custody is in behalf of the state. Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235; 179 P.2d 662."
"Since the juvenile court has not been given jurisdiction to award support money to a wife, any payments required from a father must be to and for the use of the court and may be paid over by the court only to the custodian acting in its behalf and under its control."
"It must follow necessarily that when the state relinquishes its control over a dependent child by permitting it to be taken without its jurisdiction and control, it can no longer properly contribute or supply funds toward its care and maintenance, whether such funds be public funds or funds received by it from a father obligated for its support."
"Accordingly, in the instant case, when the juvenile court permitted the mother to take the dependent child to the state of Massachusetts, without security, term or condition for its return, it abandoned control and lost jurisdiction of the child and could no longer properly transmit or require payment for its support."
"The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with instruction to dismiss the contempt proceeding."
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
etc., such persons as Judge Nicholas Massaro, Magistrate Jane Westbrook, and Magistrate Cynthia Cyphers resorted to violations of C.R.S. 19-1-104(6). C.R.S. 18-8-114 (Abuse of public records), C.R.S. 18-8-105 (Accessory to crime), C.R.S. 18-3-303 (False imprisonment), 18 U.S. Code § 3 (Accessory after the fact), 18 U.S. Code § 4 (Misprision of felony), 18 U.S. Code § 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S. Code § 241 (Conspiracy against rights), etc., in a flagrantly criminal Colorado-public-policy-violating attempt to intimidate Dave into waiving his legal rights to contest a self-evidently juridictionless legal-nullity child support order and the jurisdictionless legal-nullity relocating of two little American-citizen boys, Ben and Toby Wilkenson, to England with a profoundly mentally ill and violent English-citizen mother who has at no time and in no way EVER obeyed Massaro's final custody and parenting time order.
2. Amicus curae brief on jury nullification by R.J. Tavel, J.D. http://fija.org/docs/CI_Indiana_vs_Thompson.txt
State Of Indiana v. Linda Thompson, J.D.
“HUGO BLACK, a great believer in the Jury system, used to tell this story--"
“Years ago, in the foot-hills of Alabama, a tenant-farmer was charged criminally with stealing a cow from his landlord, and was brought to trial. As was frequently the case in rural America, the Jurors selected for the trial were acquainted with everyone, including the accused and his victim. Each juror knew that the farmer's landlord was a nasty bastard who tormented his neighbors, while frequently treating the town's orphans and widows with derision. By the same token, the tenant-farmer was the salt of the earth, beloved by everyone. But still, the evidence of his guilt was indisputable."
“After the evidence was in and the jury retired to deliberate, it quickly returned to the courtroom to announce its verdict: 'If the accused returns the cow, we find him not guilty.'"
“The judge was infuriated. His anger heightening, he commanded the jury to return to the jury room to deliberate – shrilly chastising them for their flagrantly 'arrogant' and 'illegal' verdict."
“Not a moment passed when they re-appeared in the tense courtroom to trumpet their new verdict: 'We find the accused not guilty -- and he can keep the cow.'"
“The American Jury, Justice Black reminds his listeners, is effectively omnipotent in rendering an acquittal. What hits home in Justice Black's story is the deeply-held American notion that juries often perform an independent role in a system in which the people - not prosecutors, judges or lawyers - have the last word. In the end, if the jury wishes to let the defendant keep the cow, that is what will happen."
Under construction . . .
LAW REGARDING BLOGGERS:
Courts are saying that "regular citizen" bloggers have all the same 1st Amendment free-speech protections that so-called professionally trained "journalists" who work for the institutionalized establishment media do.
Freedom Of Speech, Permissible Tailoring And Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2445 (1996) - by Eugene Volokh - Volokh's Twitter
The First Amendment and Restrictions on Political Speech, by Roger Pilon - Cato Institute
It's Perfectly Legal To Film The Cops - Huffington Post
Supreme Court Requires Warrant for Cell Phone Searches by Police - ACLU - See Riley v. California, No. 13–132. Argued April 29, 2014—Decided June 25, 2014.
How To Talk To The Police 101, by John Wilkenson
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, by John Perry Barlow
What stops free flow of information is dangerous, by John Perry Barlow
Pierce v. U.S., 252 U.S. 239 (1920) - “The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law merely because the argument presented seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate in language.” ~ Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissenting.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) - “The very “purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) - "Though I doubt if the 'clear and present danger' test is congenial to the First Amendment in time of a declared war, I am certain it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of peace." ~ William O. Douglas
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Thomas again calls for overruling of Buckley v. Valeo - First Amendment Center
See also the Legal Disclaimer page for this website for a more in-depth discussion.